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nuclear weapons pose a threat not only to civilization and to all human
beings, but even to the life process itself.
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I agree, of course, with the thrust of Professor Miller's paper and
with the conclusion at which he arrives. There can be no question that
nuclear weapons pose a threat not only to civilization and to all human
beings, but even to the life process itself. It follows, then, that the
proliferation of such weapons contravenes the fundamental principles of
morality, the accepted rules of international law, and any sane idea of
national interest and policy. Furthermore, I think that Professor
Miller's five arguments make out a cogent case for his conclusion that
"the manufacture, deployment, and possible -

even probable -

use of

nuclear weapons contravene the Constitution".' Each of these arguments is closely reasoned and well supported; together they present a
persuasive defense of his claim, which might on its face appear unreasonable to the point of absurdity.
One may be tempted to object that the time-honored doctrine of
raison d'etat makes these arguments and this conclusion meaningless:
for this doctrine holds that any state is justified in taking-and is certainly going to take-whatever steps it deems necessary for its own
protection. However, this argument fails for the simple reason that
when several states possess significant numbers of nuclear weapons,
then their use by any one state would quite surely lead to retaliation
and hence to its own destruction. And this goes directly against the
purpose of raisond'etat, which is to guarantee the existence of the society of which the state is the agent.
Consequently, and as a point of departure for this response, I am
prepared to stipulate Professor Miller's conclusion that "those who
wield both formal authority and effective control in the American constitutional order have a duty to take action designed to eliminate the
nuclear threat throughout the world" and that "the duty. . is of con* Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, University of Alabama.
1. Miller, Nuclear Weapons and the Constitution, 7 NOVA L.J. 21, 23 (1982).
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stitutional dimension."'2 However, despite all of this, I fear that the
conclusion itself will be inconsequential because it has no precise and
positive content. Stated more explicitly, the nature of this "constitutional duty" is both unspecified and devoid of sanctions; it does not
impose any clearly defined obligations, either positive or negative, upon
those to whom it is addressed; and it does not suggest any ways in
which these "obligations" could be enforced and derelictions therefrom
punished. This judgment must be qualified by pointing out, as Professor
Miller stresses, that this essay is a "preliminary inquiry," not a "fulldress exposition." 3 Its purpose is to raise an issue rather than settle it,
and so to initiate a cooperative discussion of legal (constitutional) procedures as a possible means to control the deployment and use of nuclear weapons. A final judgment, therefore, must be held in abeyance;
but as the case now stands, I fear that however admirable the end
sought, the means proposed will prove ineffective.
The argument that supports this judgment stands on three legs.
Each of these is itself based upon a contention or concession that is
central to Professor Miller's case and essential to its understanding and
evaluation. My purpose in developing this argument is to indicate the
difficulties I perceive in his position and thus to contribute as best I can
to the discussion he seeks. He has made an admirably provocative start,
and the undertaking is eminently worthwhile.
I take my first step with Professor Miller's statement that his paper "is emphatically not a plea for unilateral disarmament. We live in
a Hobbesian world, a condition that is not at all likely to change." 4
Since the nations of the world have rejected the irenic precept of live
and let live, adopting instead a policy of dog eat dog, the international
climate is poisoned by mistrust and fear. Given this atmosphere, any
suggestion of unilateral disarmament would be tantamount to putting
one's self at the mercy of one's enemies. If nuclear disarmament is to
be safe and acceptable, it must be mutual, with every nation disposing
of its entire arsenal: "every weapon of mass destruction in the world" 5
must be eliminated. This is the outcome that the Constitution is held to
2. Id. at 24.
3. Id. at 23.
4. Id. at 24.

5. Id.
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require. This is made quite explicit in the passage quoted earlier, where
it is stated that the "constitutional duty" imposed on the government is
"to take action designed to eliminate the nuclear threat throughout the
world"' (Emphasis added). Since nuclear weapons anywhere clearly
pose a threat to our lives, liberties, and properties, we, as American
citizens, have a right to be free of them, and the government has the
duty to see that we are.
Standing by itself, this contention appears self-evident. If the government owes us protection against arbitrary -search and seizure,
double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and cruel and unusual punishment
not to mention such benefits as clean air, pure water, adequate diet,
and proper health care - then it would certainly seem to owe us protection against instant immolation. Therefore one is inclined to take
this first step without hesitation.
This brings me to my second step. Here I take as my text Professor Miller's statement on page 23: "At the outset, I readily concede the
jurisprudential problem of whether legal norms (rights) can exist absent a means of enforcement". It is, or course, traditional doctrine that
a right accorded to some is barren without a corresponding duty imposed on others. It is further recognized that both the right and the
duty are bootless unless there are sanctions to enforce the latter and
make good the former. It is difficult to see just what legal (constitutional) means are available to secure to the people this right to the
worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons. If the Supreme Court were
to issue orders to this effect, how is it to enforce them against this
government, let alone the governments of other sovereign states?
To this objection, Professor Miller offers two rebuttals, both sound
in principle. He first points out that there are both constitutional and
legislative duties that cannot be judicially enforced or for the neglect of
which no penalty is even provided.7 Secondly, he reminds us that the
law is instrumental and living, and that the courts are continually recognizing new rights and creating new duties as the occasion seems (to
them) to require. These points are well taken, but I do not think they
are applicable in the present context. When the courts accord rights to
privacy, abortion, racial integration, and so forth, they impose duties
6. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 23.
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that are at least within the claimed and granted (albeit reluctantly)
jurisdiction of the federal government, and to enforce these rights they
can create sanctions, however ineffective and difficult to enforce they
may be. But when the courts recognize the right of American citizens
to the elimination of all nuclear weapons everywhere, they impose duties that are altogether beyond both the legal jurisdiction and the practical reach of the federal government. For the courts now tell the government of this country "to achieve certain outcomes in other countries
whose governments recognize no authority superior to themselves and
which command power commensurate with that of this country. Without a common sovereign which holds both ultimate authority and a monopoly of power, rights and duties become mere words. The gist of the
matter is this: the writ of the federal courts simply does not run in
other sovereign states.
I now take my third step, which raises the most concrete and practical issues. This is again based on the passage previously cited from
page 23 and also on another passage of similar import with which professor Miller summarizes his argument. The latter runs as follows:
"My suggestion is that Supreme Court Justices should grasp the
nettle and point out to the Executive and the Congress that officials
in those branches are charged with a constitutional duty to take
action to eliminate threats to the lives, liberties, and properties of
the citizenry. Those threats emanate from nuclear weaponry."
In both of these passages, it is the phrase "take action" that I want to
emphasize: the government is to be told that it has a "constitutional
duty" to "take action" to "eliminate the nuclear threat throughout the
world." Even if we grant that the Supreme Court should in principle
and does in fact issue orders to this effect, the critical question remains:
What action?
Precisely what actions are the Executive and the Congress to be
ordered to take? A duty which is hopelessly vague or with which compliance is impossible to determine is as empty as one that is unenforceable. And simply to order "action" would be the epitome of vagueness:
the government could claim compliance on the basis of virtually any
effort whatever; or it could refuse to disclose the "actions" it had taken,
8. Id. at 35.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss1/9

4

Jenkins: Admirable Ends-Ineffective Means
17:1982

Admirable Ends-Ineffective Means

131 1

justifying its refusal by invoking the sacred cow of the "national security". One could answer this objection by arguing that the Supreme
Court decision mandating this new duty would be similar to that in the
1954 school desegregation opinion: the Court would simply order the
President and the Congress to take steps to effect universal nuclear disarmament "with all deliberate speed". The specifics of this mandate
would then be left to be worked out in a series of suits and rulings.
But I do not believe that this argument would stand up. Mutual
nuclear disarmament by numerous sovereign states is obviously a matter of foreign policy; and the conduct of foreign policy is, by the Constitution itself, conferred on the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate. What actions this country could and should take in this
area are matters of high policy, involving diplomatic, political, military,
and economic dimensions: intelligent decisions require wide experience,
vast amounts of detailed information, and the cooperation of experts
from numerous esoteric fields. It seems doubtful if even those omniscient legal deities, the Justices of the United States Supreme Court,
could muster the data and acquire the familarity that would be needed
to issue reasonable and effective orders regarding nuclear disarmament.
The Court could, of course, solicit amicus briefs from innumerable experts; and they could subpoena witnesses and documents from the several executive departments. But much of this information is strictly
classified, hardly suitable to be aired in legal briefs, open hearings, and
the Supreme Court reports; and the advice that the Justices would receive would certainly be so diverse and contradictory that they would,
in the last analysis, have to rely upon their own judgment, untrained as
that is in this field. Even if all of these hurdles could be surmounted, it
is difficult to see what "action" the Court could order. In negotiating
the reduction of nuclear weapons with other sovereign states, there are
only two procedures this government can employ: it can threaten and it
can deal. And that is precisely what every President for at least the
past thirty years has been doing.
There are two further issues that should be considered briefly. The
first concerns Professor Miller's alternative proposal that the "firststrike use of nuclear weapons should . . . be dropped as a policy op-

9. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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tion." 10 This is a more moderate suggestion. And it is an "action" that
the Supreme Court could easily order, since it is simple and specific-enforcing the order, however, would be another matter. But quite
apart from the wisdom and practicality of such a step, I fear that it
would prove ineffective as an instrument of peace and ineffective as an
inducement to other states to take similar action, for the government
that adopted such a policy of renunciation could not bind future goverments. The state is an enduring entity; but circumstances change, and
so do governments and their perceptions of these circumstances. Consequently, the announcement of such a policy would have little meaning
or impact. It would offer no lasting guarantee to the society that
adopted it and even less to other states and their governments.
The second of these issues concerns the idea-suggested but not
developed in Professor Miller's paper-that a Supreme Court decision
condemning nuclear weapons on constitutional grounds and mandating
action to effect their worldwide elimination would have great moral
force and persuasive power. Even if the Court could not enforce such
an order or specify its meaning, its mere announcement might serve to
make the public more conscious of the terrible dangers and the ultimate evils inherent in the proliferation of nuclear arms. This is a possibility that should not be dismissed lightly. There is not the slightest
doubt that past Supreme Court decisions have had just such an impact
on this society, and even on the international order: one thinks particularly of decisions on racial integration, the equality of women, access to
the political process, and human rights in general.
However, I do have serious doubts, based on two grounds, whether
a Supreme Court ruling on nuclear weapons would have a similar impact. One of these grounds concerns the context of such a ruling. Intense suspicion of Russian policy and intentions, and hence an obsessive
fear of Russia gaining nuclear superiority, are endemic in this country.
Given this atmosphere, any such Court ruling would almost certainly
be interpreted as mandating unilateral disarmament; so it would be
greeted with outrage and dismissed with contempt.
The other ground of my doubts concerns the present public standing of the Supreme Court, for I do not think that the Court now enjoys
anything like the respect and moral authority that it once did. The
10. Miller, supra note 1, at 30.
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mystique of the Court-the sense that it was somehow above the political process, untainted by ordinary human passions, and immune to
outside pressures-has been largely stripped from it. Once the Supreme
Court was thought to be concerned only with the Eternal Law writ
large in the Constitution, and the Justices were seen as moved only by
constitutional considerations. But now we are only too aware that the
Court is concerned with the same social issues that occupy us; and we
have learned that the justices are as much influenced by their biases
and personal backgrounds as the rest of us.
This shift in view is due partly to the greatly enhanced publicity
accorded the Court, and to an increasing public cynicism regarding all
institutions. It is also due very largely to the extreme activism of the
Supreme Court in recent decades. The Court has intervened in so many
moral and social questions that touch people deeply, and it has issued
decisions that have aroused such resentment, that it is now widely regarded not as a pure servant of the law, but rather as the tool of special
interests, especially those of an ultra-"liberal" persuasion. The Supreme Court and the federal judiciary have been extremely courageous
in intervening to correct social ills that had been neglected and ignored
by all of the governmental authorities that bore responsibility for them.
But this fact does not lessen the resentment and mistrust that have
been directed against the Supreme Court.
Be all this as it may, I doubt if a Supreme Court ruling on nuclear
disarmament would have any significant moral force or persuasive
power. When survival is thought to be in question, even the strongest
moral voice falls on deaf ears, and even the most perfect argument fails
to assuage fear.
Professor Miller made it very clear that he wanted his respondents
to offer criticisms and suggestions that could fuel a further dialogue. I
have certainly offered criticisms, though suggestions, alas, have been
sadly lacking. But I would not wish to close on this negative note, for I
think Professor Miller's proposal could be extremely important:
whether it will be, only the ensuing dialogue can tell.
If we are to consider Professor Miller's paper at all sanely and
sympathetically, we must take seriously the quotations from A. N.
Whitehead with which he introduces his proposal; these set the necessary tone for his suggestion. It is precisely our fundamental and unquestioned assumptions that most need to be brought into the open and
re-examined. And when some hardy soul does this, and proposes fresh
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ideas, these are apt to appear patently absurd. And so it is with this
idea that nuclear weapons pose a constitutional issue to which lawyers
and the courts should address themselves. It has long been assumed
that the conduct of foreign policy and the care and nurture of the national security were to be left to the President and his military and
diplomatic advisors. The Congress was held to have very little business
meddling in these matters, and the federal courts to have none at all:
these latter need only recognize that treaties duly ratified were part of
the law of the land.
That is no longer a safe assumption. Professor Miller's view that
judges are "timorous creatures" who "look upon requests to go beyond
the familiar and the expected as frightful occasions"11 may be sound as
a general proposition. But it seems clearly not applicable to the federal
judiciary as a whole, nor especially to the justices of the Supreme
Court. During the past thirty years or so, these men have not hesitated
to assert that they have the highest wisdom and hold the ultimate authority in such matters as school integration, racial balance, abortion,
the prevention and punishment of capital crimes, reapportionment, and
the treatment of the mentally ill and prison inmates.12 All of these issues were regarded as altogether beyond either the jurisdiction or the
competence of judges and courts: they were the proper and ordained
domains of other experts and authorities. But in all of these contexts,
the federal courts have intervened----"meddled"-to correct persistent
and intolerable ills. I hold no strong brief for federal judges as arbiters
of moral, social, economic, and other such problems: their reach often
exceeds their grasp, and their discretion fails to match their valor. But
these judges have, time after time, acted to repair gross injustices and
initiate significant reforms.
So despite the reservations voiced above, I am sympathetic to Professor Miller's proposal and I am prepared to be optimistic that it
might bear fine fruit. I would anticipate two great obstacles to this
happy outcome. First, I do not see what measures-what "action"-the
11. Id. at 36.
12. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1960); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (1972), aff'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (1974); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
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Supreme Court could mandate, aside from those that every administration has employed: to deal and to threaten. (Though I certainly acknowledge that several of these administrations, and especially the present one, could be a great deal more restrained, constructive, and
cooperative in their dealings with the Soviets instead of treating them
as avowed enemies.) Second, and more serious, is the fact that some of
the parties-sovereign states-whose agreement is essential to nuclear
disarmament, are altogether beyond not only the grasp, but even the
reach, of the Supreme Court. Judges have encountered more than
enough recalcitrance and open defiance from state legislatures and governors. It would be interesting to be hidden behind an arras, like some
hero of a gothic romance, when some diplomat hands a Supreme Court
writ to Yuri Andropov (Brezhnev's successor), Indira Ghandi, or
Menachem Begin.
But any such event as this lies in a distant time and a different
clime. And if it ever occurs, the writ will come from a court serving as
the agent of a single world sovereign. For the foreseeable future, the
Supreme Court will have to contend itself with enhancing public consciousness of the enormity of the threat and with putting incessant
pressure on the other branches of government. On first acquaintance,
Professor Miller's proposal does such violence to our political and legal
presuppositions that it has the aura of the judicial equivalent of science
fiction. But we all know how often the science fiction of one year is the
technological fact of the next. And when I recall the changes that the
federal courts have wrought in recent decades, I think that this may
well be an idea whose time has come.
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